Malawi Vision 2020
On Monday, 18th July 1994, I sat excitedly in the delegate hall at the Ministry of Science and Technology in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohammad gave his speech on why he believed Science and Technology should be the main driver of his country’s Vision 2020. I remember this date for two reasons. First, the speech was very inspiring and second because the PM joked about how impressed he was with himself after noticing the number of delegates that kept nodding in agreement to his speech - only to realise later that they were struggling to keep awake as most delegates were football fans. On the otherside of the world (in USA), Brazil had just beaten Italy on Post-match penalties to win the World Cup and most of us had watched the match till 06am Malaysia time, and quickly took a shower, rushed to the meeting which started at 09am. It was a moment of brilliance spicing the rather practical and professional meeting.
In his speech he outlined why Malaysia adopted Vision 2020 in 1991 and the 9 key challenges that they had to confront to achieve their vision 2020, which was also based on a concept of Malaysia Incorporated- meaning a public -private sector partnership to development. What is important to note however is the political drive that was behind Malaysia’s vision 2020, starting from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to those driving politics at lower levels including business leaders. This became obvious when I visited several Ministries, public-private sector Organisations and small businesses before returning to Malawi. These key stakeholders and population at large had internalised and institutionalised the vision 2020 message. There was noticeable consistency in their messaging and each had their mini- vision 2020 whose sum-total would contribute towards the larger Malaysia vision
Malaysia’s vision 2020 was also crafted to respond to its political historical perspectives - economy that had dominant ethnic minority( Chinese ) and a largely poor indigenous population (Bumiputeras). This meant that each sector (human and productive) had to address the political economy to ensure there was inclusive development and the liberal development approach being promoted (combination of state intervention, privatisation, private enterprise and competitive markets etc). Of course not all was rosy for Malaysia, but the country is where it is because they had a vision, led by a political leadership with a vision and a process that led to a buy-in by the majority of the population.
On my return, energised, I sold the concept to my colleagues at MIPA. The then CEO, Mr James Mpeta Phiri was excited about the concept and he devised mechanism on how we could sell the concept to the Government. We had to find an entry point. First we had to convince our MIPA board, which was then chaired by Chris Barrow. After we got approval, we then had to get Cabinet buy-in. The first Ministers that quickly picked up the concept were the late Chakufwa Chihana (Then Vice President and Minister of Irrigation) and Late Aleke Banda (then Minister of Finance and Economic Development). We also got the buy-in of the late Kalonga Stambuli (Muluzi’s Economic Adviser). Using the three, we started writing papers and feeding them with what should be the way forward. We believed the concept had to be pushed by our politicians, paid from our own (internal) resources and they (politicians and civil servants) had to believe in it before reaching out to the country.
Many things changed in a very short space of time. The most prominent was the change from a “MIPA proposed approach” (Politicians/Govt/Business led - therefore use of Government/business resources) to the preferred “UNDP approach” - mobilise donor funds, which would be transferred to Government to support the process of developing the vision 2020.
This meant Vision 2020 was now to be led by technocrats. UNDP brought in their consultants and these worked with a team of Malawian technocrats based in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. Both approaches had pluses and minuses. The UNDP approach however in my view had two problems. First, it brought in the much despised “Allowance syndrome”. People had to be paid allowances to drive the process. More worrying was that government had to pay allowances to those being consulted. In villages, Chiefs would not answer questions until the brown envelopes were handed out.
The second problem was that politicians became divorced from the process and got involved in their own petty projects to push ministry agendas. For example, Brown Mpinganjira reached out to Malaysia as Minister of Telecommunication and he picked up on the mobile phone revolution and brought in TNM to establish the first mobile company in Malawi with 500 subscribers. This is not to suggest that such developments were not good for the country. They were rather disjointed and did not speak to the original intention of how we could drive our development approach through the vision 2020.
I believe what I call the “MIPA approach” which was a modified Malaysia approach had more pluses and may have worked well especially in the first 5 years of Muluzi administration. Ministers during the first 5 years of Muluzi administration were independent and were strong characters. There was a window during which they could have pushed for new direction and thus help in internalising Vision 2020 within their sectors/Ministries. Muluzi as a key driver, probably missed the opportunity and later he got so engrossed in his petty project of extending his rule.
The biggest losers were of course the citizens and the population at large. Sadly, the process of developing Vision 2020 (as well as its meaning) led to an increased “dependency and selfish culture” where you had to be paid allowances to contribute any ideas to country’s development- SILLY THEY MAY HAVE BEEN.
In his speech he outlined why Malaysia adopted Vision 2020 in 1991 and the 9 key challenges that they had to confront to achieve their vision 2020, which was also based on a concept of Malaysia Incorporated- meaning a public -private sector partnership to development. What is important to note however is the political drive that was behind Malaysia’s vision 2020, starting from the Prime Minister and his Cabinet to those driving politics at lower levels including business leaders. This became obvious when I visited several Ministries, public-private sector Organisations and small businesses before returning to Malawi. These key stakeholders and population at large had internalised and institutionalised the vision 2020 message. There was noticeable consistency in their messaging and each had their mini- vision 2020 whose sum-total would contribute towards the larger Malaysia vision
Malaysia’s vision 2020 was also crafted to respond to its political historical perspectives - economy that had dominant ethnic minority( Chinese ) and a largely poor indigenous population (Bumiputeras). This meant that each sector (human and productive) had to address the political economy to ensure there was inclusive development and the liberal development approach being promoted (combination of state intervention, privatisation, private enterprise and competitive markets etc). Of course not all was rosy for Malaysia, but the country is where it is because they had a vision, led by a political leadership with a vision and a process that led to a buy-in by the majority of the population.
On my return, energised, I sold the concept to my colleagues at MIPA. The then CEO, Mr James Mpeta Phiri was excited about the concept and he devised mechanism on how we could sell the concept to the Government. We had to find an entry point. First we had to convince our MIPA board, which was then chaired by Chris Barrow. After we got approval, we then had to get Cabinet buy-in. The first Ministers that quickly picked up the concept were the late Chakufwa Chihana (Then Vice President and Minister of Irrigation) and Late Aleke Banda (then Minister of Finance and Economic Development). We also got the buy-in of the late Kalonga Stambuli (Muluzi’s Economic Adviser). Using the three, we started writing papers and feeding them with what should be the way forward. We believed the concept had to be pushed by our politicians, paid from our own (internal) resources and they (politicians and civil servants) had to believe in it before reaching out to the country.
Many things changed in a very short space of time. The most prominent was the change from a “MIPA proposed approach” (Politicians/Govt/Business led - therefore use of Government/business resources) to the preferred “UNDP approach” - mobilise donor funds, which would be transferred to Government to support the process of developing the vision 2020.
This meant Vision 2020 was now to be led by technocrats. UNDP brought in their consultants and these worked with a team of Malawian technocrats based in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. Both approaches had pluses and minuses. The UNDP approach however in my view had two problems. First, it brought in the much despised “Allowance syndrome”. People had to be paid allowances to drive the process. More worrying was that government had to pay allowances to those being consulted. In villages, Chiefs would not answer questions until the brown envelopes were handed out.
The second problem was that politicians became divorced from the process and got involved in their own petty projects to push ministry agendas. For example, Brown Mpinganjira reached out to Malaysia as Minister of Telecommunication and he picked up on the mobile phone revolution and brought in TNM to establish the first mobile company in Malawi with 500 subscribers. This is not to suggest that such developments were not good for the country. They were rather disjointed and did not speak to the original intention of how we could drive our development approach through the vision 2020.
I believe what I call the “MIPA approach” which was a modified Malaysia approach had more pluses and may have worked well especially in the first 5 years of Muluzi administration. Ministers during the first 5 years of Muluzi administration were independent and were strong characters. There was a window during which they could have pushed for new direction and thus help in internalising Vision 2020 within their sectors/Ministries. Muluzi as a key driver, probably missed the opportunity and later he got so engrossed in his petty project of extending his rule.
The biggest losers were of course the citizens and the population at large. Sadly, the process of developing Vision 2020 (as well as its meaning) led to an increased “dependency and selfish culture” where you had to be paid allowances to contribute any ideas to country’s development- SILLY THEY MAY HAVE BEEN.
Comments
Post a Comment